News
Civil Rights
- [09/01] New York imam: Mosque fight about Muslim role
- [08/19] Germany considering income tax equality for gays
- [08/19] Muslim employee: Disney banned her head scarf
Employment Practices
- [08/19] Workplace deaths fall to lowest level since 1992
- [07/29]
Labor
- [09/02] Unemployment claims drop for second straight week
- [08/26] Army ending its GED program for aspiring soldiers
- [08/26] New jobless claims drop for first time in 4 weeks
Case Summaries
Civil Rights
[09/02]
Carlson v. Bukovic
In plaintiff's civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against an officer for excessive force and the city for failure to train the officer, district court's judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed where: 1) mere physical contact by an officer, although significant factor, does not automatically qualify an encounter as a Fourth Amendment seizure; 2) district court correctly submitted the question of whether a seizure took place to the jury; 3) the jury was entitled to determine that, at the time the officer touched plaintiff's arm, officer's action was more exhortatory than commanding; 4) because plaintiff's section 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim failed, her failure-to-train claim against the city fails as well; and 5) plaintiff's claim that the district judge was biased need not be addressed as recusal was unnecessary in this case.
[09/02]
Weber v.Universities Research Ass'n, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against her former employer for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff has waived her discrimination and retaliation arguments under the direct method of proof; and 2) plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, because even if she does not have to show that she was meeting defendant's legitimate business expectations, defendant is still entitled to summary judgment as she has failed to show that there were similarly situated men who were treated more favorably than she was.
[09/02]
Goldhamer v. Nagode
In plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit alleging violations of their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and under state law, challenging a city ordinance's failure-to-disperse provision of section 8-4-010(d), district court's judgment permanently enjoining the city from enforcing the provision on the ground that it imposes too great a burden on protected free speech and is unconstitutionally vague is vacated and remanded as, plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the facial validity of the ordinance at issue as they were not even arguably violating the failure-to-disperse provision when they were arrested for demonstrating against military recruitment, and plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable prospect of future arrest for again violating that same provision.
[09/01]
Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action brought against several New York City nightclubs for discriminating against men on “Ladies’ Nights," dismissal of the complaint is affirmed where the nightclubs were not state actors and thus were not subject to section 1983.
Class Actions
[08/25]
Fireside Bank Cases
In coordinated class actions challenging a lender's collection practices, trial court's entry of dismissals with prejudice against all class members against whom the lender had previously secured judgments in separate collection actions is affirmed where: 1) plaintiffs' contention that the trial court was empowered by the UCL to grant class-wide relief to judgment debtors without a factual showing of grounds to avoid the judgments against them is rejected, and, since no other basis for relief on their behalf was ever suggested, the court did not err by concluding that the UCL afforded no basis for the class-wide affirmative relief sought in this class action; and 2) the appeal is dismissed as moot insofar as it is taken from orders denying leave to intervene and refusing to certify a subclass consisting of judgment debtors.
[08/24]
Holster v. Gatco, Inc.
In a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is affirmed where: 1) to the extent that the Second Circuit's prior holding was based on treating the TCPA "as if it were a state law," Shady Grove's holding that Rule 23 generally preempts C.P.L.R. 901(b) abrogated the court's holding; and 2) the TCPA constituted a delegation by Congress to the states of considerable power to determine which causes of action lie under the TCPA.
[08/23]
Gutierrez v. California Commerce Club, Inc.
In plaintiffs' putative class action lawsuit against California Commerce Club, Inc. (Club), claiming that they and other similarly situated members of the class were injured by defendant's unlawful policy and practice of denying meal and rest breaks to certain hourly, non-union employees, trial court's order sustaining defendant's demurrer without leave to amend is reversed as it was premature for the trial court to make determinations pertaining to class suitability on demurrer as plaintiffs' allegations of the operative complaint were sufficient to move the action beyond the pleading stage.
[08/20]
Schleicher v. Wendt
In a securities-fraud suit against some managers of a large, publicly traded financial-services holding company, district court's conclusion that investors can use the fraud-on-the-market doctrine as a replacement for person-specific proof of reliance and causation in granting the class certification is affirmed as, the district court assured itself that the market for the company's stock was thick enough to transmit defendants' statements to investors by way of the price, and as such, the district court did not commit a legal error, or abuse of discretion, in deciding that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine should not be conscripted to serve some other function.
Labor & Employment Law
[09/02]
Weber v.Universities Research Ass'n, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against her former employer for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff has waived her discrimination and retaliation arguments under the direct method of proof; and 2) plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, because even if she does not have to show that she was meeting defendant's legitimate business expectations, defendant is still entitled to summary judgment as she has failed to show that there were similarly situated men who were treated more favorably than she was.
[09/02]
Branham v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) against her former employer for being terminated from her job as a receptionist, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer is reversed and remanded where: 1) the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to defendant based on the submission of negative medical certification indicating that plaintiff could return to work; 2) plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about her entitlement to FMLA leave, and defendant was not permitted to deny her leave based on the certification requirement when it never properly requested certification or informed her of the consequences of failing to provide the same, as required by Department of Labor regulations.
[09/01]
Polycarpe v. E&S Landscaping Serv., Inc.
In consolidated Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) actions claiming that during plaintiffs' employment they worked more than forty hours per week and defendant employers failed to pay them either a federally mandated minimum wage, federally mandated overtime pay, or both, summary judgment for defendants is reversed where: 1) if a district court, ruling for a defendant, applied the "coming to rest" doctrine -- for instance, by looking at where defendant bought an item instead of where an item was produced, the court must vacate the judgment for the defendant if there was a question about where the "goods" or "materials" were produced or where they moved; and 2) for the purposes of the FLSA's handling clause, an item will count as "materials" if it accords with the definition of "materials" -- tools or other articles necessary for doing or making something -- in the context of its use and if the employer has employees "handling, selling, or otherwise working on" the item for the employer's commercial (not just any) purposes.
[09/01]
Sprinkles v. Associated Indem. Corp.
In plaintiffs' bad faith action against Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, arising from an underlying suit against defendant and his employer for causing the death of plaintiffs' father in an automobile accident, trial court's judgment sustaining the insurer's demurrer is affirmed as, under the complaint and matters judicially noticed, the defendant-employee was an insured, rendering the automobile exclusion in the GCL policy applicable, and Fireman's Fund had no duty to defend the employer.
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